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We propose a program that would further promote housing privatization in 
China.  In addition to operating its current Housing Savings Fund program, 
the government could guarantee loans, with payments capped at affordable 
levels or spread out over workable payment periods.  Such a program would 
balance efficiency with fairness by encouraging market forces, while 
addressing practical necessities (lenders’ rights, corruption, labor mobility) so 
that privatization could relieve the burden on government and taxpayers.  Net 
benefits would arise through the private market’s greater efficiency in 





As the rapidly growing Chinese economy moves increasingly towards one 
with a market orientation, with the development of property rights and 
greater protections for private ownership, the country is considering 
instituting policies to further promote home ownership.  In fact, the Chinese 
Government has implemented a series of policies to create incentives for 
privatizing government housing, including substantial rent increases and a 
Housing Saving Fund Program.  Significant progress has been made, but as 
of the end of 2001, approximately 30 percent of public housing residents still 
could not afford to own their dwelling units.
1  Instead, these low-income or 
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unemployed households have continued to live in state-owned apartment 
buildings.   
 
While residents of these properties benefit from low rent payments, and from 
the government’s assumption of maintenance costs, this arrangement is 
economically inefficient, in that tenants have little incentive to maintain the 
properties they occupy.  The lack of home ownership among low income 
households might even pose threats to social stability.  Advancing home 
ownership has come to been seen in Western systems as a means of fostering 
financial security and, at the same time, enhancing social stability by 
building commitment to owners’ communities and broadening access to the 
political environment.  In this paper, we propose a program that would allow 




A Brief Review of Housing Subsidies in Developed 
Economies 
 
A.   Government Rental Subsidies 
 
A brief discussion of housing subsidies, including rental subsidies, in other 
countries is relevant because inefficient provisions found in some countries’ 
policies should not be replicated in the policies we recommend for China.  
Much of the housing subsidy activity around the world has focused on the 
providers (supply side subsidies) and occupants (demand side subsidies) of 
rental property.  For example, income-related tenant subsidies are common 
in many countries.  Assistance to builders of rental housing for low-income 
families is popular as well, in the form of below-market interest rates or 
favorable income tax treatment.
2  
 
In the U.S., about five million low and moderate income families currently 
receive some form of federal subsidy through the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) or Department of Agriculture.
3   The 
residents need not be destitute; a Chicago family of four with a $52,500 
annual income qualifies as “low income” for purposes of Section 8 
assistance through the HUD.  A low-income family living in an HUD-
qualified property pays a monthly rent no greater than 15–25% of its 
monthly household income, depending on the household’s income and size. 
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Other countries also subsidize considerable amounts of their citizens’ rental 
housing expenses.  One nation with a long tradition of subsidies is the 
United Kingdom.  After 1979, the Thatcher government began replacing 
subsidies to local rental housing agencies with income-related housing 
assistance.  In the late 1980s, the Conservative government decontrolled 
rents and started subsidizing investments in private rental housing.  Prior to 
the 1988 social security reforms, housing benefits were provided in two 
forms: supplementary benefits and rent rebate/rent allowance programs.   
More recently, the U.K. has enacted a tax benefit program to attract capital 
to the country’s small private rental housing sector; tax write-offs are 
provided to investors who purchase shares in new companies that provide 
new privately owned rental housing. 
 
France also has a long tradition of rental housing assistance.  Shortly after 
the Housing Act of 1948 eliminated rent controls on new construction, a 
housing allowance program was created for the benefit of families with 
children.  In Australia, where almost 50% of households receive some type 
of government housing subsidy, public housing rents were increased to 
market levels in 1981, but a rent rebate was provided to any household if the 
market rent it paid was more than 20% of its income.  Belgium also provides 
income-related rent subsidies to renters.
4   In Finland and many other 
countries, governments provide low interest rate loans to builders that 
participate in low income housing programs. 
 
Germany is another country with rental subsidy arrangements.  In 1965, a 
major new housing allowance program was started in the former West 
Germany to reduce the rent burden for low-income households, keeping 
housing costs no higher than 15–25% of total household income.  A housing 
allowance program introduced in the Netherlands on a limited scale in 1970 
was substantially expanded in 1975 to support the government’s rent 
harmonization policy, which was aimed at raising rents for existing units to 
more closely match the rents for new dwellings.  
 
Obviously, the objectives of government subsidies can differ.  Denmark, 
France, Finland, Germany, and Sweden have programs that target both 
renters and owners; whereas the British, Australian, and Dutch systems 
provide assistance primarily to renters.  Indeed, the move in some countries 
from housing subsidies oriented toward producers to those directed at 
consumers has been an interesting phenomenon.  France, for example, has 
introduced an additional renters’ allowance as part of a policy to shift 
assistance away from “bricks and mortar” toward personal subsidies.
5  This 
type of shift reflects governmental efforts to use public money more 
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efficiently, based on the view that giving housing allowances to consumers 
can help bolster the market, whereas the act of subsidizing producers, 
especially if coupled with rent controls, tends to subvert the market.   
Academic research has shown that direct assistance to tenants is almost 
always more efficient than assistance based on the property occupied, for 
reasons that include avoiding disincentives for maintenance, and keeping all 
related costs easily measured and “on-budget.”
6  
 
Finally, as in the U.S., certain forms of housing assistance in some other 
countries are provided to needy tenants by local governments, rather than at 
the national level.  Several of the Canadian provinces operate their own 
housing allowance programs; Ireland is another country where local 
authorities administer different rental assistance plans, while similar schemes 
exist in some Swiss cantons.
7  
 
B.  Government Subsidies to Ownership
8  
 
In addition to assisting renters, many western nations have long followed 
policies of subsidizing home ownership.  Income tax deductibility of 
mortgage loan interest appears in some form in most industrial countries 
(although Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, and the U.K. are 
exceptions).  Indeed, the untaxed imputed rental value of an owned 
residence – a valuable benefit of home ownership (true in most countries, 
with the Netherlands applying a slight tax as a counter example) – is made 
stronger by the fact that home owners in the U.S. and most of Western 
Europe can claim business-like deductions on the expense side, while not 
having to claim the rental value on the income side.  The supportive 
environment surely plays a role in fostering high home ownership 
percentages (more than 67 percent among U.S. households).    
 
Other limited subsidies to home ownership sometimes arise.  In the U.S., for 
example, an income tax credit was proposed, although not implemented, for 
first-time home buyers nationwide in 1992 (a credit for buyers in 
Washington, D.C. was temporarily implemented later), and first-time buyers 
can withdraw up to $10,000 without penalty from tax-sheltered Roth IRA 
retirement savings plans.  Australia, Finland, and Ireland are other countries 
that have provided first-time home buyer subsidies in the form of down 
payment assistance or reduced loan payments.  The U.S. federal government 
helps non-affluent home buyers obtain financing for which they might not 
otherwise qualify, while local U.S. communities have made limited use of 
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their municipal borrowing powers to borrow money at low interest rates and 
re-lend it to low or moderate income home buying families. 
   
C.   Private Housing Subsidies 
 
Subsidies for housing purchases are sometimes provided by private parties.  
In the U.S., for example, some educational institutions and employers in 
high-cost housing areas have begun programs to sell homes at below-market 
prices to their workers, just as major companies have long helped transferred 
employees with financing during periods of high interest rates.  The U.S. 
military’s provision of housing subsidies to its “employees” is an interesting 
hybrid of employer and government assistance.    
 
Private assistance may, on the other hand, be motivated purely by charity.  
Religious organizations have provided housing assistance in forms that 
include below market rents (in properties owned by a church or one of its 
members) and favorable financing.  Better known is a large private 
charitable organization such as Habitat for Humanity International (HFHI), 
which makes extensive use of volunteer labor and donated material in 
building or rehabilitating homes for low income families.  Yet, even (or 
perhaps especially) when the subsidy is charitable in nature, the provider of 
the assistance should consider taking steps to prevent the recipient from 
behaving in ways that would thwart the subsidy’s intentions.         
 
 
The Effects of Housing Subsidies  
 
Consider, for example, the steps HFHI takes to prevent buyers from 
purchasing homes at below-market prices and then “flipping” (immediately 
selling) them at higher market prices.  A common practice is for a local 
HFHI chapter to share any profits that result from resale, perhaps until ten 
years after the subsidized home purchase.  A profit sharing arrangement 
helps create a useful balance: an owner who could keep all resale profits 
would be motivated to flip, thereby undermining HFHI’s goal of providing 
needy families with housing (rather than monetary benefits).  But an owner 
with no claim on resale profits would have no motivation to maintain the 
property, thereby undermining the integrity of the neighborhoods where 
HFHI homes are built.  To further prevent owners from withdrawing their 
equity by refinancing, HFHI may hold a “soft” second mortgage on the 
property, which requires no direct payments unless the home is sold in the 
first several years (perhaps ten) after the purchase.  
 
One question that must be addressed is whether housing is subsidized simply 
to improve housing availability and affordability, or whether policymakers 126 Gu and Trefzger 
 
are attempting to address broader social or economic issues through a 
housing program.  For example, some countries in Europe have, in the past, 
used housing subsidies to promote labor mobility, directing the movement of 
workers to areas where policymakers felt they were needed.  Sweden’s 
National Labor Market Board is a case in point.  The agency buys workers’ 
houses to assist them in liquidating their investments, so they can purchase 
new residences in the areas to which they relocate.  In the U.K. and France, 
“new town” policies were enacted by the British and French governments to 
encourage workers to move away from major population centers, such as 
London and Paris, to centers of new economic growth and development.  
The General Labor Market Board in the former West Germany provided 
migrant workers with low interest rate loans, and Norway has provided 
migrant workers with 100% financing to purchase new homes.  Israel has 
provided its citizens with generous terms on mortgage loans, to promote 
growth in the country’s less developed areas, and the Netherlands has 
periodically given families money toward meeting the costs of equipping 
new homes.  Because the Chinese Government has stated, as a major goal, 
the development of the country’s northwest and inner areas, policymakers 
have considered offering generous housing subsidies as a way to attract 
people to move to those regions.    
 
Another question relating to housing subsidies is whether unintended effects, 
particularly inequality, might arise.  In the U.S., for example, 70 percent of 
renters with incomes below the poverty line receive no governmental 
subsidies, while 43 percent of families assisted by HUD programs have 
incomes above the poverty line (a family of eight could qualify for Section 8 
assistance with an income approaching $70,000).  Still another issue is that 
the government’s subsidy activities, be they on the supply side or the 
demand side, can have an upward impact on the market, thus causing 
potential confusion over what constitutes the “market rent” used as a 
benchmark in further subsidized transactions.  Indeed, most subsidy 
programs, regardless of the country of origin, have been tremendously costly; 
governments routinely pay much more for program beneficiaries to obtain 
subsidized housing than the housing services would seem to be worth.  One 
estimate holds that 20 percent, on average, of the money spent on such 
programs as public housing, or HUD’s Section 236 (existing residential 
rental property) and Section 8 (new or rehabilitated rental housing) 
undertakings, is wasted, even excluding administrative costs.
9  
 
Concerns over rampant corruption also plague programs that provide 
subsidies to suppliers of housing, since developers who meet program 
qualifications are often accused of making excessive profits, and therefore 
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would be willing to bribe officials for the privilege of getting their projects 
approved.  Actual or potential corruption problems prompted the U.S. 
Government to end all direct subsidies to housing producers in the early 
1970s, while the British Government ended certain producer subsidies in 
1981.  Perhaps even more troubling is that the benefits are uncertain, in that 
there is no evidence indicating that tax savings programs have helped solve 
the housing affordability problems faced by low income families.  The costs 
are uncertain as well, in that a reduction in tax revenues is “off-budget,” so 
the true cost (in terms of distortions in economic activity) is effectively out 
of the public eye.
10  While subsidy programs are sure to generate at least 
some controversy no matter what form they take, it seems that they should at 




Our Proposed Program 
 
Globally, the most common subsidy to residential ownership is the lack of 
(or very light) taxation of the imputed rents and capital gains that 
homeowners must support.
11  We believe that private homes should enjoy 
similar treatment as China’s private tax system emerges.  For reasons of 
efficiency, the home ownership assistance program that we propose would 
probably have to be administered at a national government level, with a 
nationwide interest rate set by the central bank.  Local jurisdictions might 
lack the needed resources, and a national program administered locally could 
lead to overspending in the hope of passing costs along to other jurisdictions.  
A benefit of local administration, however, would be to allow different 
communities to serve as laboratories in learning what specific provisions 
work best.  In addition, more explicit features of the type of housing subsidy 
appropriate to China would be: 
 
A.  The government should sell all publicly owned properties to residents 
  
Turning properties over to their current occupants would promote efficiency, 
in that a private owner has an incentive to protect his investment (both in the 
property and in its surroundings) from physical decay and adverse social 
conditions.  (Note that publicly owned multi-family housing in the U.S. 
became the locus of the country’s worst crime and other social problems.)  
In fact, simply giving public housing units to their current occupants would 
prevent some problems that would accompany prices tied to income or 
wealth measures: falsely understating income or seeking jobs with low cash 
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incomes but high non-cash benefits (such as opportunities to engage in self-
help activities).  Placing the housing stock into private hands would also 
allow for property taxation, an outcome that meshes well with the Chinese 
Government’s goal of expanding the tax base.
12  However, fairness questions 
would arise over the amount of money each current tenant would pay for his 
or her unit, with greater unfairness present at a higher difference between an 
objective measure of the market value and the transaction price.  Practicality 
issues might dictate that not all current public housing residents could buy 
their units.  
 
B.  The government should provide assistance in the mortgage borrowing 
process.   
 
One type of such assistance would be for the government to guarantee 
mortgage loans issued by commercial banks, since each buyer would need 
financing, and a purely private market might have trouble providing it (at 
least in the market’s developmental stages).  Among problems that a lending 
community would face, at least while this new market was taking shape, 
would be ongoing questions over true collateral values, and lenders’ inability 
to underwrite effectively where there has been no societal tradition of private 
borrowing in recent decades.  (One aspect of China’s attempts to strengthen 
its banking system has been to expand asset-based lending.
13)  These 
problems are, perhaps, not unlike those that motivated the creation of the 
now-mammoth secondary mortgage market in the U.S. – a market that 
required governmental involvement in its early years, and which has evolved 
into a major force both in making possible home ownership and in 
generating creative investment products.  
 
Another form of assistance to mortgage borrowers would be a benefit (such 
as income tax deductibility) for the interest paid.  One argument in favor of 
loan interest benefits is that lower-income families are the ones that must 
borrow to buy housing, so those of low and moderate means are strongly 
represented among program participants.  However, fairness concerns might 
arise if the government sells public housing units to their occupants at 
favorable prices and then subsidizes the loans, at the expense of other 
taxpayers (though if the loans were small, the benefits would be small as 
well).  Efficiency concerns can also arise, especially with a benefit not 
limited to the poor, if the subsidy serves to increase the demand for housing 
relative to that of other goods (or if greater investment in housing crowds out 
needed industrial capital spending in a growing economy).  An argument 
against income tax-based subsidies is that they are more valuable if marginal 
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tax rates are higher, perhaps reducing incentives for citizens to resist growth 
in an inefficient public sector.  Finally, it should be noted that that some 
countries, particularly Australia and Sweden, have reduced or terminated 
their home ownership subsidy programs; one concern is that a subsidy such 
as lower financing costs, especially for properties located in a developed 
urban area, might simply be capitalized into a higher purchase price.
14  
  
C.  A family’s monthly mortgage loan payment should be determined as a 
portion of its monthly household income.   
 
This provision is based on practical considerations.  The family must be able 
to afford the payments or the program will fail.  One approach might be to 
sell a public housing unit to its occupant at a price that would, under 
reasonable mortgage lending terms, keep the periodic housing payment at a 
level near 25% of periodic income (a figure close to developed countries’ 
payment guidelines under both government rental assistance programs and 
private mortgage lending plans).  An attendant benefit would be the ease of 
adjusting across higher and lower cost housing areas.  An alternative, or 
perhaps accompanying, feature could be to allow the length of the payment 
stream to differ from one case to another, based on the household’s income 
and the amount of money borrowed (which, in turn, would reflect the 
property’s value and the amount of equity the government conferred on the 
borrower).   
 
D.  The household should be able to sell the property, but the proceeds 
should have to be used to pay off the loan first.  
 
The concern here would not be the same as the concern faced by HFHI in 
the U.S.  Whereas HFHI fears damage to its reputation and its volunteers’ 
morale if home owners sell for quick profits, and thus the organization 
requires equity sharing, the Chinese Government would have no reputational 
concerns, as it would be getting out of the activity of having to own and 
maintain residential property.  An equity-sharing requirement could be 
imposed, but even without a sharing of built-in price appreciation, a sale 
would lead to an efficient allocation of resources in a Coasian sense.  The 
reason for requiring a “due-on-sale” clause in the arrangement is the same as 
its reason for existing in the U.S. private lending market: to protect the 
property rights of lending organizations and the investors who finance their 
activities (such as being able to examine the new occupant’s financial 
situation).    
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E.  The government should specify the maximum price it would guarantee 
for future transactions (and the properties eligible for such 
guarantees).   
 
The illiquidity of an investment in home equity could cause two potential 
problems in an emerging private housing market.  One is that fears over 
liquidity issues would reduce the initial prices that buyers could justify 
paying and the amounts they would be willing to spend on ongoing 
maintenance.  Another is that the inability to sell quickly and without high 
transaction costs could reduce homeowners’ willingness to move to new 
regions, even when they have lost their jobs.  Thus, there is a view (backed 
by some empirical evidence) that home ownership interferes with labor 
mobility and thus contributes to unemployment.
15  The possibility of such an 
outcome should be of special concern if the public sector provides generous 
benefits to those who have lost their jobs.  This last provision of our 
proposal would effectively create a put option for each buyer, thereby 
creating liquidity in a market that otherwise would be very uncertain during 
its developmental stages.   
  
The advantages of a program with these features would be as follows: 
 
A. It would not alter market forces/prices in the housing market, in that the 
properties that would be conveyed by the government to private owners 
are already occupied by those private parties.  Furthermore, an 
ownership assistance program would not suffer from the potential 
“crowding out” of better tenants that can plague rental subsidy 
programs;
16 all home owners would have an incentive to maintain their 
properties and communities.  There could be market effects, however, 
if the termination of public housing caused the current residents to alter 
their preferences for housing services, especially if the amount of 
equity conveyed on the new private owners (i.e., the price discount 
relative to an objective market value measure) were substantial, or if 
the payment of the mortgage loan interest generated taxes or other 
benefits that might accrue disproportionately to higher income 
households.    
 
B.  It would create incentives to work and learn skills for higher wages, in 
that the availability of better housing increases both the set of goods 
available to consumers and the set of savings/investment vehicles from 
which to select.   
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C.  It would create incentives for the new home owners to maintain their 
properties, in that their home equity would become an important 
component of their private wealth.  This situation argues in favor of 
conferring a higher amount of equity (i.e., for the government to more 
aggressively discount the price relative to an objective market value 
measure) in each transaction.   
D. It would lower costs for the government and taxpayers, in that the 
public housing experience internationally has demonstrated that the 
lack of incentives for efficient management, and for the parties most 
affected (the residents) to assume personal responsibility, leads to 
extremely high operating costs, not to mention high levels of crime and 
other social problems (while studies suggest that home ownership has a 
desirable effect on education, crime, and other societal issues).  A 
private party, such as an association of the owners of the units in a 
multi-family building, could meet the costs of management services 
(staff salaries, benefits, taxes, maintenance and repair costs, and office 
and equipment outlays) more efficiently than a governmental agency 
could.  (One study has estimated that China’s government enterprises 
are only 60% as efficient as the country’s privately financed 
enterprises.
17)  The money thereby saved across the society could be 
used to provide low-income households with greater assistance in 
paying for maintenance, or for mortgage financing. 
 
 
A Simple Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
The desirability of this approach can be seen in a comparison with the cost 
effectiveness of housing subsidies in the U.S. and other developed 
economies, such as giving property away to its occupants, charging below-
market rents, charging rent based on income, or creating housing vouchers.  
The net benefit of our proposed program can be represented as: 
 
NB = f(GM,GS,PS) 
where NB =  the net savings benefit to society; 
GM = government management costs, a deadweight cost that results from 
the need to oversee programs that would be unnecessary if publicly owned 
housing became privately owned;     
GS = the government’s cost of providing maintenance and other services; 
and 
PS = the cost to private owners of providing those services after purchase. 
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where T represents the duration of the program and r represents the 
appropriate discount rate.   
 
Based on empirical evidence, GS>PS because of the cost savings that would 
result from private parties’ incentives to operate more efficiently.  Of course, 
this program would not be without costs of its own.  For example, the 
savings from dismantling the government ownership agencies would be 
offset, at least to some degree, by the costs of operating a huge government 
apparatus to provide loan guarantees.  Among the ongoing costs to the 
government, therefore, would be those of dealing with default rates that 
would surely be high, while prepayment rates would likely be low.  Such 
costs would have to be expected in the transition from an entitlement-based 
to a market-based housing system.  (Depending on the broader intent of the 
program, the government might create additional incentives, such as 
reducing a family’s mortgage loan payments if all school age family 
members attend school regularly and do well in it, or reducing the proportion 
of payments relative to income for those who graduate from educational 
programs and find better jobs; such offerings would lead to still higher costs.)  
But because of the incentives to behave efficiently toward building greater 
personal wealth, a loan guarantee program would have to be much cheaper 
than the government’s direct operation of a large scale housing system.   
 
The costs of supporting a loan guarantee program would also be offset by 
the gains that society would enjoy through the development of a secondary 
mortgage market.  These gains would not be limited to enhanced liquidity in 
the housing market; because a market for the sale of mortgage notes would 
help open the door to a more sophisticated financial marketplace overall.  
The secondary mortgage market in the U.S. has paved the way for a range of 
asset-based lending products, and for derivative instruments that greatly 
enhance investment and risk management choices.  Recently, the Chinese 
Government announced an interest in establishing a secondary mortgage 
market, which will help pave the way for a range of asset-based lending 
products, and for derivative instruments that greatly enhance investment and 
risk management choices in China.  Financial modernization of this type is 
important, since many experts believe that China’s financial sector has 
limited the economy’s ability to grow. 
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Some Final Comments 
 
Our recommendation (convey public housing to its current residents, with 
assistance in financing, and with appropriate limitations and assurances 
regarding disposition in resale) is quite general; specifics would likely have 
to emerge as different approaches are tried.  But experience with rental and, 
more importantly, home ownership subsidies that have existed in many 
developed and developing countries over many decades indicate the most 
important issues to address when designing a system that balances efficiency 
questions with fairness concerns.  Our hope is that the need for features such 
as financing assistance and the accompanying limitations on borrowers 
would be phased out as the market matures and private ownership becomes 
widespread.  However, the progress is sure to be slow, because the goal of 
moving to universal home ownership and a fully privatized financing system 
is one that still eludes even the most developed countries. 
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